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Abstract 
 
This study demonstrates that a Phillips curve relationship can be derived from a model with 
efficiency wages and imperfect information about aggregate wages or prices. The model’s first-
order conditions produce equations for the dynamic labor demand (DLD) curve and the dynamic 
efficiency wage-setting (DEWS) condition, and the paths of inflation and unemployment depend 
on the interaction between these curves. If one of these expressions is substituted into the other, a 
third relationship is derived, and this relationship has the characteristics of a Phillips curve, in 
which unemployment and inflation are both endogenously determined. The Phillips curve is a 
much more convenient and parsimonious specification than the DEWS condition. Depending on 
how often wages are adjusted, the Phillips curve may be either purely backward looking or have 
both a forward-looking and backward-looking component. The model has an equilibrium 
unemployment rate, and the Phillips curve and DLD curve can be used to show the dynamics of 
inflation and unemployment as they adjust from their initial equilibrium to their new equilibrium 
in response to demand shocks. The predicted coefficient on the unemployment rate in the 
Phillips curve is reasonably close to values that have been estimated with U.S. data, and the 
model does a very good job of explaining the typical unemployment dynamics in post-WWII 
recessions.  
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Efficiency Wage Setting, Labor Demand, and Phillips Curve Microfoundations 
  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Phillips curve was originally developed as a relationship between unemployment and 
the rate of either wage or price inflation.
1
 Subsequent work by Friedman (1968) and Phelps 
(1968) argued that expected inflation should be included as an independent variable in a Phillips 
curve, with a predicted coefficient of 1. While researchers have found empirical evidence for the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve,
2
 it has been much more difficult to provide theoretical 
justification for it. For example, Mankiw (2001, p. C46) states, “The [Phillips curve] tradeoff 
remains mysterious, however, for the economics profession has yet to produce a satisfactory 
theory to explain it.”3 In addition, the Phillips curve does not have a counterpart curve in 
unemployment – inflation space, which means that it shows the combinations of unemployment 
and inflation that are possible but does not predict the actual values of these variables. 
This study demonstrates that a downward-sloping Phillips curve results from the profit-
maximizing behavior of firms, under the assumptions that firms pay efficiency wages and that 
workers and/or firms have imperfect information about aggregate wages or prices. Because 
information is imperfect, workers and firms predict aggregate wages or prices either through a 
sticky information process, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002), or through mixed rational and 
adaptive expectations, as in Campbell (2010) and Levine et al. (2012). The Phillips curve is 
purely backward looking when wages can be adjusted once each period, but has both a 
backward-looking and forward-looking component when wages are adjusted less often.   
A wage-wage Phillips curve is obtained if workers’ efficiency depends on their wages 
relative to the average wage, and a price-price Phillips curve is obtained if their efficiency 
depends on real wages. In addition, this study derives the counterpart to the Phillips curve 
 2 
(referred to as the dynamic labor demand curve) in inflation – unemployment space from the 
same framework used to derive the Phillips curve. This curve is upward sloping when the 
dependent variable is wage inflation and is downward sloping when the dependent variable is 
price inflation. Shifts in the Phillips curve and the dynamic labor demand curve trace out the 
paths of inflation and unemployment in response to demand or technology shocks. 
Previous Phillips curve research is discussed in Section II. Section III develops a model 
in which efficiency depends on relative wages and in which workers have imperfect information 
about average wages. It is first assumed that firms can adjust wages each period. While this 
assumption is not realistic for modeling quarterly dynamics, it is useful for showing how the 
Phillips curve is derived from the interaction of the dynamic labor demand (DLD) curve and the 
dynamic efficiency wage-setting (DEWS) condition. These equations are obtained by 
substituting the production function and the unemployment equation into the model’s first-order 
conditions and taking first differences. In both the DLD curve and the DEWS condition, wage 
inflation is a function of the unemployment rate, as well as other variables.   
In response to shocks to the growth rate of nominal demand, shifts in the DLD curve and 
DEWS condition determine the paths of wage inflation and unemployment. A rise (fall) in 
demand growth initially reduces (raises) unemployment and raises (reduces) inflation by less 
than demand growth changes. Over time, unemployment returns to its initial level, and wage 
inflation equals the new growth rate of demand. Thus, the model is characterized by a natural 
rate of unemployment.  
There is another way to derive the transition paths of inflation and unemployment in 
response to exogenous shocks. If labor demand is substituted into the efficiency wage-setting 
condition, a third relationship is obtained, and the transition can be illustrated by the intersections 
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between the dynamic labor demand curve and this new relationship. This third relationship has 
the characteristics of a Phillips curve in which wage inflation is related to unemployment and 
expected wage inflation, with the coefficient on expected inflation equaling 1. In this 
relationship, unemployment and inflation are both endogenously determined.  
While the economy’s transition path can be illustrated either by the DLD curve and the 
DEWS condition or by the DLD curve and the Phillips curve, the latter is a more parsimonious 
and convenient specification. The Phillips curve depends on just expected inflation and 
unemployment, and the coefficient on expected inflation equals one. In contrast, the DEWS 
condition depends on more variables, including the change in nominal demand (which is nearly 
impossible to observe), and the coefficient on expected inflation will generally not equal one.  
The model in Section III is then modified by allowing only a fraction of firms to adjust 
wages each period, making it more suitable to model quarterly dynamics. In addition to workers 
having imperfect knowledge about current average wages, in this case it is also assumed that 
firms’ expectations of future wages are partly adaptive. It is demonstrated that current wage 
inflation depends on unemployment and on both lagged and expected future wage inflation. With 
this extension, the Phillips curve’s predicted slope is reasonably close to empirically estimated 
values, and the model makes realistic predictions about the time it takes unemployment to reach 
its maximum value and for it to return to the natural rate, following a recessionary shock.  
Section IV develops a model in which efficiency depends on workers’ real wages. With 
this specification, the interaction between the DLD curve and the DEWS condition results in a 
Phillips curve in which price inflation depends on expected price inflation (with a coefficient of 
1), the unemployment rate, and technology shocks. The DLD – Phillips curve framework is used 
to show the effects of both demand and technology shocks.  
 4 
In Section V, the issue of whether workers’ efficiency is more likely to depend on real or 
relative wages is discussed. Section VI considers an extension of the model in which effort is a 
function of the ratio between workers’ wages and their reference wages, and it is argued that this 
modification enables the model to explain a wider set of phenomena. Section VII concludes.  
This study expands upon the work of Campbell (2010), which develops a barebones 
version of the model in this study. This previous study derives equations for the wage-wage and 
price-price Phillips curves, but does not derive the dynamic labor demand curve or the dynamic 
efficiency wage-setting condition, nor does it consider staggered wage adjustments. The present 
study shows how a Phillips curve results from shifts of the dynamic labor demand curve and the 
dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition, it derives the transition paths the economy follows in 
response to demand and technology shocks, it provides a more complete specification of 
workers’ behavior, and it allows wages to be adjusted sporadically.  
II. Relation to Other Phillips Curve Models 
Two models of the Phillips curve that have been developed in recent years are the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve and the sticky information Phillips curve. Roberts (1995) shows that 
the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be derived from the staggered contract models of Taylor 
(1979, 1980) and Calvo (1983) and from the quadratic adjustment cost model of Rotemberg 
(1982). Roberts demonstrates that these sticky price models all yield the prediction that inflation 
depends on expectations of future inflation and on the output gap.  
While the sticky price model is widely used in policy analysis,
4
 it has been criticized on 
several grounds. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) find that it predicts much less inflation persistence 
than is observed in actual data, and Ball (1994) shows that announced, credible disinflations may 
cause booms in this model. The New Keynesian Phillips curve predicts that inflation depends on 
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output and expected future inflation, yet several studies find evidence against models in which 
expectations are purely forward looking. For example, Fuhrer (1997) regresses current inflation 
on lagged inflation, expected future inflation, and the output gap. He finds that the sum of 
coefficients is much higher on lagged inflation than on future inflation, and he cannot reject the 
hypothesis that expectations are purely backward looking. Rudd and Whelan (2005) rewrite the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve, by repeated substitution, as a relationship between current 
inflation and the discounted sum of expected future output gaps. They then demonstrate that 
there is little evidence for forward-looking expectations and that forward-looking behavior is 
strongly dominated by backward-looking behavior.
5
 In fact, some studies that incorporate the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), assume that 
firms index their prices to lagged inflation if they cannot reset them, to enable their models to 
more accurately describe macroeconomic dynamics. 
Galí and Gertler (1999) develop another variant of the sticky price Phillips curve in 
which inflation depends on marginal cost, which is measured by labor’s share of national 
income, and they demonstrate that their model outperforms a model in which inflation depends 
on the output gap. While they show that price inflation depends on the behavior of wages, their 
study does not analyze the factors that determine wages. 
Models with overlapping wage contracts are developed in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin 
(2000), Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and Galí (2011), 
under the assumption that workers set their own wages. However, this assumption does not 
characterize wage setting for the vast majority of workers, and it means that unemployment 
cannot legitimately be considered as involuntary.  
 6 
In the present study inflation displays persistence, since the Phillips curve depends, at 
least partly, on lagged inflation. In contrast to the sticky-price derivation of the Phillips curve, a 
downward-sloping Phillips curve can be derived if firms are free to set wages and prices in each 
period, although including wage contracts results in a flatter Phillips curve. The Phillips curve 
derived in this study also differs from the New Keynesian Phillips curve in that it is a 
relationship between inflation and unemployment, as the Phillips curve was initially specified, 
rather than between inflation and output. To econometrically estimate the Phillips curve, the 
former is a more useful specification. The measured output gap depends on the calculated value 
of potential GDP, which is estimated imprecisely because of uncertainties about the natural rate 
and about the Okun’s law relationship between unemployment deviations and output deviations.6 
On the other hand, only the first uncertainty is relevant when the Phillips curve is estimated with 
the difference between actual unemployment and the natural rate on the right-hand side.  
In the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006), a firm’s optimal price 
depends on aggregate prices and output. In each period, a fraction of firms receives information 
that enables them to compute optimal prices, while the remaining firms operate with out-of-date 
information. In Mankiw and Reis (2006), it is also assumed that workers set their own wages, but 
have sticky information concerning the determinants of the optimal wage.  
The present model is similar to Mankiw and Reis in that economic fluctuations result 
from imperfect information, and one type of information imperfection considered is sporadic 
updating by workers about the values of aggregate wages or prices. However, the present study 
differs from Mankiw and Reis by assuming that it is firms, rather than workers, who set wages, 
an assumption that more realistically describes actual practice. Also, as previously discussed, 
unemployment in models in which workers set wages cannot be viewed as truly involuntary. In 
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addition, the Phillips curve derived here is a relationship between inflation and unemployment, 
whereas the sticky information Phillips curve relates inflation to real output.  
The present study also differs from both the New Keynesian and the sticky information 
Phillips curves by deriving the counterpart curve to the Phillips curve and by developing a model 
in which the economy is characterized by equilibrium unemployment.  
III. The Wage-Wage Phillips Curve 
 
The economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum of ex ante identical individuals 
and firms. It is also assumed that firms make random errors in setting wages, but that the profit-
maximizing wage is set on average. Because wages vary across firms, workers do not know the 
mean of the aggregate wage distribution with certainty. The rest of this section considers the 
assumptions about individuals’ behavior, firms’ behavior, and the derivations of the dynamic 
labor demand curve, the dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition, and the Phillips curve.  
 
Assumptions about individuals’ behavior 
 
This subsection develops the theoretical framework to explain individuals’ decisions 
regarding labor supply, effort, product demand, and information acquisition. It is assumed that 
individuals’ utility depends positively on their consumption and their leisure, with  representing 
the relative weight placed on leisure. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), total consumption (c) is the 
composite of the output purchased from individual firms. Assuming a continuity of firms, 
indexed from 0 to 1, total consumption can be expressed as 
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Utility is also assumed to depend on workers’ effort (e), with the marginal utility being 
negative in equilibrium. While increased effort lowers workers’ current utility, it also reduces the 
probability of him or her being dismissed, which increases expected future utility. A rational 
worker balances the costs and benefits of effort in deciding how hard to work. Since a dismissed 
worker needs to find work elsewhere, the optimal level of effort depends on the average wage 
paid by other firms, which workers may not know with certainty since wages vary across firms. 
Workers who form incorrect expectations of the average wage will exert a non-optimal level of 
effort and incur a utility loss as a result.
7
 However, information about current average wages is 
assumed to be costly, so a rational worker may not acquire all available information.  
A worker seeks to maximize  
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where  is the discount rate, ]Pr[ itEmp   is the probability that the worker is employed in period 
t+i, X is leisure in the periods in which the individual is employed, T is time allotment (allocated 
between labor, leisure, and acquiring information),  and are parameters representing the 
utility or disutility of effort, W is the wage,
 
eW
 
represents workers’ expectations of the average 
wage, r is the interest rate, and P(f) is the price of the fth firm’s output. In addition, I represents 
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the amount of information acquired about average wages, (I) is the expected utility loss 
resulting from imperfect information about average wages (with ´(I)<0), and z is the time spent 
obtaining information. The first term in the utility function is the utility from consumption, the 
second is the utility from leisure when the employee is working, the third is the utility from 
leisure when the individual is unemployed, and the fourth is the utility or disutility of effort when 
the employee is working.  
If the first-order conditions are approximated around their steady-state equilibria, it can 
be demonstrated that labor supply can be expressed as  
 
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where W
SS
 and SSP  represent the steady-state values of wages and prices.
8
 The short-run labor-
supply elasticity (i.e., NN / ) will be denoted by . 
This constrained maximization problem can also be used to derive an expression for 
workers’ effort, although this derivation is quite complex. Campbell (2006) develops a model of 
workers’ effort with a similar utility function and budget constraint and makes assumptions 
about the probability of dismissal (as a function of a worker’s effort) and the probability of an 
unemployed worker being hired.
9
 It is demonstrated that workers’ efficiency depends on the ratio 
of their current wage to the average wage at other firms and on the unemployment rate, such that 
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where Wt is the wage at a worker’s current firm, 
e
tW denotes workers’ expectations of the 
average wage rate, and ut is the unemployment rate.
10
 
 10 
Given the assumption about total consumption being the composite of individual goods, 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) demonstrate that the demand curve facing each firm can be expressed as 
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where P is the firm’s price, P is the aggregate price level,  is the price elasticity of demand, and 
Y is real aggregate demand per firm. 
Since it is costly to obtain information about average wages, workers may choose not to 
acquire all available information that enables them to predict the average wage (which they need 
to estimate to optimize their effort), particularly because the relevant comparison is wages for 
workers in the same occupational group, and current data on occupational wages are not easily 
obtainable.
11
 As a result, their expectations may not necessarily satisfy the criteria for rational 
expectations and may be based partly on old information. This study considers two ways that 
workers may form expectations when information is costly. One is that only a fraction of 
workers gets updated information in each period, as in the sticky information model, and the 
other is that each worker’s expectations are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations.  
Assumptions about firms’ behavior 
 
1. Firms produce output (Q) with the Cobb-Douglas production function,  
   tettttt u,W/WeKLAQ  10 , (5) 
 
where A represents technology (assumed to be exogenous and labor augmenting), L is labor, 
and K is capital (assumed to be fixed). It is assumed that firms have unbiased expectations 
about workers’ expectations of the average wage ( etW ). 
2. Real aggregate demand per firm is determined from the constant velocity specification,  
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 ttt PMY / ,  (6) 
where M is nominal demand per firm.  
3.  Parameters are such that firms pay efficiency wages, yielding excess supply of labor.
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 The 
unemployment rate can be expressed as 
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4.  All firms share a common efficiency function, but individual firms do not know the effect of 
wages on efficiency with certainty. As a result, each firm views its value of We  as  
      itettWtettiW u,W/Weu,W/We , , 
 where i is a firm-specific white noise error. As a result of these random errors in estimating 
We , wages vary across firms, but the profit-maximizing wage is set on average. 
5. It is costly for firms both to acquire information about next period’s average wage and to set 
its current wage at a non-optimal level as a result of incorrect expectations about next 
period’s average wage. (This assumption is only relevant when only a fraction of firms can 
adjust wages each period.) Because firms may not acquire all relevant information, their 
expectations may not be fully rational. These costs could be incorporated into the profit 
function, although the solution for information acquisition would be trivial.  
Derivations of the DLD, DEWS, and Phillips curves when wages can be adjusted each period 
 
 By solving (4) for tP  and multiplying by tQ , total revenue is given by 
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It is first assumed that firms are free to adjust wages and prices each period. With this 
assumption, it is demonstrated that the interaction between the DLD curve and the DEWS 
condition produces a Phillips curve and that the Phillips curve is downward sloping, even if all 
firms can adjust wages and prices. By differentiating the profit function with respect to wages 
and employment, the following first-order conditions for the average firm are obtained: 
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Combining (9a) and (9b) and taking steady-state values (i.e., WW  ) results in the 
equilibrium condition, 
     .1,1,1 1  ueueW  (10) 
The steady-state condition, 11 eeW , determines the economy’s natural rate of 
unemployment. In addition, this condition will be used to simplify equations expressed in terms 
of deviations from steady-state values.  
Equation (9a) is the labor demand curve, and (9b) is the efficiency wage-setting 
condition. Totally differentiating (9a) and (9b) and dividing by the original equations yields  
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where variables with “^”’s over them represent percentage deviations from steady-state values 
(e.g., ttt WdWW /
ˆ  ). The above equations express the relationships between percentage 
deviations in Wt, percentage deviations in 
e
tW , and percentage-point deviations in ut from their 
equilibrium values. (Thus, dut=ut–u*, where u* is the natural rate.) If small deviations of W, 
eW , 
and u from their steady-state values are considered, the coefficients on these variables can be 
treated as constants, with these constants determined by the equilibrium values of Wt, 
e
tW , e, 
We , ue , WWe , and Wue .   
The Appendix demonstrates that calculating deviations in steady-state values in the 
production function (5) and the unemployment equation (7) and substituting these expressions 
into (11a) and (11b) results in the following equations for wages: 
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where Ls  is the equilibrium value of 1-u. Equations (12a) and (12b) are, respectively, the labor 
demand curve and the efficiency wage-setting condition, expressed as relationships between 
wages and unemployment. By subtracting the lag of each equation, the following expressions for 
wage inflation are obtained: 
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Equation (13a) will be called the dynamic labor demand (DLD) curve, and equation (13b) 
will be called the dynamic efficiency wage-setting (DEWS) condition. The dynamic efficiency 
wage-setting condition is a relatively complicated expression that includes the changes in the 
unemployment rate, expected average wages, expected prices, and nominal demand. Neither the 
coefficient on the change in expected average wages nor the coefficient on the change in 
expected prices will generally equal 1. 
The DLD-DEWS framework can be used to show how wage inflation and unemployment 
evolve over time in response to a shock to the growth rate of nominal demand ( tMˆ ). In 
particular, it is assumed that demand is growing at a rate of g
o
 prior to period 1 and that demand 
growth decreases to g
n
 in period 1 and remains at g
n
 indefinitely. Since wages can be adjusted 
each period, it is reasonable to view a period as corresponding to a year. To simulate a demand 
shock, it is necessary to make assumptions about the parameters in (13a) and (13b) and about the 
nature of inflationary expectations. For parameters, the equilibrium unemployment rate is set at 
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5%, equilibrium effort (e) is assumed to equal 0.8, and We  is determined from (10). Values for 
ue  and Wue  are determined from the effort model of Campbell (2006) with the condition that the 
elasticity of efficiency with respect to unemployment equals 0.05, consistent with estimates in 
Weisskopf (1987) and Wadhwani and Wall (1991).
13
 The model of Campbell (2006) also yields 
a value for WWe , which results in a realistic Phillips curve slope with sporadic wage adjustment 
(as demonstrated in the next subsection), but yields a slope that is much higher than empirical 
estimates if wages are adjusted each period. Thus, WWe  is set so that the slope of the Phillips 
curve equals -1, in line with Blanchard and Katz’s (1997) estimates with annual data. In addition, 
the short-run labor supply elasticity (is assumed to equal 0 since empirical studies find that 
this elasticity is low.
14
 
There are several ways in which inflationary expectations can be modeled. It could be 
assumed that inflationary expectations are rational, in which case nominal demand shocks have 
no systematic effect on unemployment. However, workers may choose not to acquire all 
available information because of the cost of information.    
If information is costly, there are at least two approaches to modeling expectations. One 
is to assume, in the spirit of Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky information model, that each 
period a fraction of workers receives new information about the current and expected future 
values of all macroeconomic variables, while the rest operate with out-of-date information.
15
 Let 
(I) represent the proportion of workers who receive new information in each period, with  
0)(  I  (i.e., an increase in I means that information is updated more frequently). Suppose that 
workers whose information has not been updated expect wages to continue to grow at a rate of 
g
o
. Suppose also that workers who have received new information know the true growth rate of 
demand, know the true fraction of workers receiving new information in each period, and know 
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the wage expectations of workers whose information has not been updated since period 0. Then 
these workers will have rational expectations about average wages from the time they receive 
this information onwards. Thus, overall expectations can be expressed as 
ot
tt
te
t tgIWIW ))(1()
ˆ]())(1(1[ˆ   , (14) 
where t is a white noise error. A second approach to modeling workers’ expectations when 
information is costly is to assume, as in Campbell (2010) and Levine et al. (2012), that 
expectations are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations, so that  
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where  represents the degree to which expectations are rational, with 0)(  I .16 A model 
providing justification for this assumption from workers’ utility maximization is derived in 
Campbell (2013).
17
 In addition, Levine et al. (2012) develop a DSGE model both under the 
assumption that all firms and households have rational expectations and the assumption that a 
proportion of households and firms have rational expectations and the rest have adaptive 
expectations. They find that, “All behavioural models [i.e., models with mixed rational and 
adaptive expectations] ‘decisively’, in fact very decisively, dominate the purely rational models 
with very large LL [log likelihood] differences of around 20.” With their best specification they 
estimate that 17-25% of firms and 30-34% of households have rational expectations.  
To demonstrate the effects of nominal demand shocks (technology shocks are also 
considered in Section IV), simulations are performed under both assumptions about wage 
expectations. In simulations with mixed rational and adaptive expectations,  is set at 0.5 (i.e., 
expectations are treated as an equal mixture of rational and adaptive expectations), and it is 
 17 
assumed that 1=1 and 032  T  , consistent with empirical evidence with annual 
data.
18
 For the sticky information model,  is set at 0.5.  
Figures 1a (with mixed rational and adaptive expectations) and 1b (with sticky 
information ) show how wage inflation and unemployment respond over time to a decrease in the 
growth rate of demand from 5% to 0%. The DLD and the DEWS curves are shown for the initial 
equilibrium and the first three periods following the reduction in demand growth.
19
 Values of 
inflation and unemployment are denoted by dots (including values after period 3), and the initial 
and first five unemployment–inflation points are numbered. This demand shock initially causes a 
rise in unemployment and a fall in wage inflation. Over time, the economy eventually reaches a 
new equilibrium in which unemployment returns to the natural rate and inflation equals the new 
growth rate of demand. By comparing Figures 1a and 1b, it is seen that unemployment and 
inflation in period 1 are the same with both assumptions and that wages and unemployment 
adjust slowly to equilibrium in both cases. The differences are that unemployment falls below 
the natural rate in Figure 1a, but not in Figure 1b, and that convergence is slower in Figure 1b, 
since, with sticky information, some workers still expect that wages have been increasing 5% per 
period since period 1. Because the results are qualitatively similar, only the results with mixed 
rational and adaptive expectations are shown in the remainder of this study. 
While the DLD-DEWS framework is one way to show the paths of wage inflation and 
unemployment in the transition between equilbria, there is another way to show the transition 
paths. If (12a) is solved for tMˆ  and the resulting expression is substituted into (12b), the 
following equation is obtained for an individual firm’s optimal wage: 
 t
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By subtracting 1
ˆ
tW  from both sides of (16) and averaging across firms, the relationship 
between wage inflation, expected wage inflation, and unemployment is 
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 Equation (17) has the characteristics of a Phillips curve (PC), as the coefficient on 
expected inflation equals 1, the difference between the current unemployment rate and the 
natural rate (i.e., dut) appears on the right-hand side with a negative sign (since 0ue , 0Wue , 
and 0WWe ), and the growth rate of demand is not an explanatory variable.  
If expectations are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations, there is another way 
to express the Phillips curve. Substituting (15) into (16) and averaging across firms yields  
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While (17) and (18) are equivalent specifications, they differ in two ways:  affects the 
slope of (18) but not of (17), and the Phillip curve is shifted by expected inflation in (17), but is 
shifted by lagged inflation in (18). (These specifications are identical if =0.)  
Figure 2 illustrates the response of wage inflation and unemployment to a decline in the 
growth rate of demand from 5% to 0%, using the DLD-PC framework. (The DEWS curve is also 
included in Figure 2.) The Phillips curve (as expressed in (18)) is shifted by lagged wage 
inflation, and the DLD curve is shifted by changes in the growth rate of nominal demand and by 
lagged unemployment. Figure 2 shows that the DLD-PC framework and the DLD-DEWS 
framework both predict the same paths for wage inflation and unemployment.   
While the DLD-DEWS framework and the DLD-PC framework give the same results, 
the Phillips curve is a much more parsimonious specification than the dynamic efficiency wage-
 19 
setting condition. The DEWS condition includes the changes in nominal demand and expected 
prices, variables that do not appear in the Phillips curve. The unemployment variable is its level 
in the Phillips curve, but is its change in the DEWS condition. In addition, the DEWS condition 
includes the change in wage expectations, and the coefficient on this difference depends on the 
model’s microeconomic parameters. Thus, it is likely to vary across countries and across time, 
and it is unlikely to equal 1. In contrast, the Phillips curve includes expected wage inflation, and 
the coefficient on this variable equals 1 for any set of microeconomic parameters.  
The exogenous variable that shifts the DLD and DEWS curves, and thus determines the 
trajectory of unemployment and inflation, is the growth rate of nominal demand. In deriving the 
Phillips curve, however, nominal demand drops out. Thus, the Phillips curve can be viewed as 
the relationship between two endogenous variables as they adjust in response to a nominal 
demand shock. The actual values of unemployment and wage inflation depend on the interaction 
between the Phillips curve and the DLD curve.  
In (17) and (18), wage inflation is a function of unemployment and either expected wage 
inflation or lagged wage inflation (i.e., a wage-wage Phillips curve). However, when economists 
estimate Phillips curves, the right-hand side variable is generally expected price inflation rather 
than expected wage inflation. While expected price inflation is the independent variable in the 
vast majority of Phillips curve studies, the right-hand side variable in Phelps’s (1968) seminal 
paper is expected wage inflation, resulting in a wage-wage Phillips curve (although this equation 
is not empirically estimated).
21
 
Even if workers’ efficiency is a function of relative wages, it is still likely that researchers 
will find evidence for a price-price and wage-price Phillips curve, as well as for a wage-wage 
Phillips curve. Campbell (2009) demonstrates that a model in which efficiency depends on 
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relative wages yields asymptotic price-price and wage-price Phillip curves when the economy is 
subjected to stochastic aggregate demand shocks. In this model, equations are derived for the 
paths of wages, prices, and unemployment in response to nominal demand shocks, and these 
equations are used as data in a theoretical regression of either price inflation or wage inflation on 
unemployment and lagged price inflation. In these regressions, the coefficient on lagged price 
inflation asymptotically approaches 1 as the sample size increases, and it is close to 1 even when 
the sample size is small.  
Technology shocks ( Aˆ ) do not appear in the dynamic labor demand curve, the dynamic 
efficiency wage-setting condition, or the Phillips curve, which means that these shocks leave 
nominal wages and unemployment unchanged in both the short run and the long run. While 
technology shocks do not affect wages and unemployment, these shocks immediately and 
permanently change prices by - times the percentage change in technology.  
A Model with Overlapping Wage Contracts 
The model can be extended to assume that wages are set by multi-period overlapping 
contracts. In the model in the previous subsection, wages can be changed each period, which 
implies that a period in these models corresponds to a year of actual time. However, to model 
short-run fluctuations it is more convenient to treat a period as a quarter. With a period 
corresponding to a quarter, it is reasonable to assume that only a fraction of firms adjust wages 
each period and that these adjustments are not synchronized. Let  represent the proportion of 
firms that can change wages in each period and  represent the discount rate. Then the Appendix 
demonstrates that wage inflation ( wt ) can be expressed as, 
 t
WW
Wuuew
t
ew
t
w
t du
e
ee 








 
)1(1
)]1(1[
)1(1
)]1(1[
)1(1
)1( ,,
1








 , (19) 
 21 
where  ewt
,  represents workers’ expectations of wage inflation in period t  and ewt
,
1  represents 
firms’ expectations of next period’s wage inflation at the time they set wages for period t. As 
before, workers’ expectations of current average wages are treated as a mixture of rational and 
adaptive expectations. In addition, in line with the findings of Levine at al. (2012), firms’ 
expectations of future wages are also assumed to be a mixture of rational and adaptive 
expectations. Because expectational lags are likely to be long with quarterly data, a geometric lag 
structure is used. For simplicity, the degree to which expectations are rational and the geometric 
lag parameter in the adaptive component are assumed to be the same for both workers and firms. 
In particular, the specifications for expected wage inflation are  
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where uewt
,
1 represents firms’ unbiased expectations of future wages. Substituting (20) and (21) 
into (19) yields the following expression for current wage inflation:   
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The DLD-PC framework is used to simulate the economy’s response to a deceleration in 
the growth rate of nominal demand. In simulating this shock, the quarterly discount factor () is 
set at 0.99, and the fraction of firms adjusting wages () is assumed to equal 0.25, implying that 
wages are adjusted, on average, once each year. Values of u*, , e, We , ue , and Wue  are the same 
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as before. In addition, WWe  is also determined from the effort model of Campbell (2006).
22
 Thus, 
ue , Wue , and WWe  are all determined from a micro-based effort model based on the utility 
function in (1). A value for * is chosen to minimize the sum of squared errors been actual wage 
inflation (with quarterly Employment Cost Index data) and the value predicted by the geometric 
lag structure with eight lags. Based on this criterion, * is set at 0.32. The parameter 
measuring the extent to which expectations are rational is set equal to 0.25, consistent with 
Levine et al.’s (2012) estimates of the degree of rational expectations. These estimates are also in 
line with Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) assumption that 25% of firms receive new information each 
quarter. The value of wt 1 is calculated by solving (12a) for dut, substituting the resulting 
expression into (22), and solving a difference equation in wage levels.  
With these parameters, the predicted coefficient on the unemployment rate is –0.141. In 
addition, if it is assumed that firms do not have perfect information about current wage inflation 
when they set wages,
23
 and estimate current inflation through a mixture of rational and adaptive 
expectations, then the predicted coefficient is –0.116. When Galí (2011) estimates the New 
Keynesian wage Phillips curve with quarterly data through the end of 2007 (with lagged year-to-
year price inflation as a dependent variable), the sum of coefficients is –0.096 or –0.099, 
depending on the measure of wages.
24
 Campbell (1997) estimates conventional wage Phillips 
curves with quarterly Employment Cost Index data, and finds that the sum of coefficients on 
unemployment lies between –0.0910 and –0.109. Thus, the predicted coefficient on the 
unemployment rate is close to coefficients estimated with U.S. data, and it is remarkably close if 
firms lack perfect information about current wage inflation. The most important determinants of 
this slope are  and WWWuu eee /)(  , and both values are based on microeconomic evidence.
25
 
The value of the first comes from the assumption that the average worker’s wages are adjusted 
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once a year, and the value of the second is determined from the microeconomic-based effort 
model of Campbell (2006), using independent, yet similar, estimates from Weisskopf (1987) and 
Wadhwani and Wall (1991) about the effect of unemployment on productivity.  
Figure 3 shows how unemployment and wage inflation respond to a deceleration of the 
growth rate of nominal demand from a 1.25% quarterly rate (i.e., a 5% annual rate) in period 0 
and prior to 0% in period 1 and thereafter. The initial equilibrium is marked with “0.” In this 
initial equilibrium, the unemployment rate is slightly below the natural rate consistent with zero 
inflation because demand is rising and the sum of coefficients on expected future inflation and 
lagged inflation is slightly less than 1, since <1. (If =1, then u=5% in period 0.) In response to 
this disinflationary shock, wage inflation gradually declines and unemployment increases, until it 
reaches its maximum value in period 5. It remains close to this value in period 6 and then starts 
to fall significantly in period 7, until it falls to within 0.2% of the natural rate in period 14. In 
post-WWII recessions, the median time for unemployment to reach its maximum after the 
recession began (based on the NBER’s dating) is six quarters, and the median time for it to fall to 
within 0.2% of the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) estimate of the natural rate is 13.5 
quarters.
26
 Thus the theoretical model, based on the optimizing behavior of individuals and firms, 
does a very good job of explaining both the slope of the Phillips curve and the economy’s 
behavior in the typical postwar recession.
27
  
 
IV. The Price-Price Phillips Curve 
It is now assumed that workers’ efficiency depends on the ratio between their wages and 
their expectations of the price level. Only the case in which prices can be adjusted each period is 
considered since Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) find a great degree of heterogeneity in the 
frequency of price changes across sectors of the U.S. economy and since Christiano et al. (2005) 
 24 
find that overlapping wage contracts are much more important than overlapping price contracts 
in explaining macroeconomic dynamics. If efficiency depends on wages relative to price 
expectations, equations (5), (8), (9a), and (9b) become  
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Combining (25a) and (25b) and taking steady-state values yields the following 
equilibrium condition: 
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As in Section III, this steady-state condition determines the natural rate of unemployment 
and will be used to simplify equations expressed in terms of deviations from equilibrium values.  
The Appendix derives equations for the dynamic labor demand curve, the dynamic 
efficiency wage-setting condition, and the Phillips curve, and it is demonstrated that the dynamic 
labor demand curve and the Phillips curve are, respectively, 
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 (28)  
where  equals the equilibrium real wage. The dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition is 
quite complex and is not reported in the main body of the text. As before, the Phillips curve is a 
more parsimonious specification than the DEWS condition, and the growth rate of nominal 
demand appears in the DEWS condition but not in the Phillips curve.  
In the Phillips curve in (28), the coefficient on expected inflation equals 1 and the 
coefficient on the unemployment rate is negative, since 1->0, eu>0, eWW<0, eWu<0, ≥0, and 
>0. In addition, price inflation depends negatively on technology shocks.  
Figure 4 shows the paths of unemployment and price inflation in response to a 
deceleration in the growth of nominal demand from g
o
 to g
n
 (where g
o
=5% and g
n
=0%), using 
the dynamic labor demand curve (27) and the Phillips curve (28) for the initial equilibrium and 
for three periods following the deceleration in demand.
29
 As before, values of unemployment and 
inflation are denoted by dots (including values after period 3). This deceleration initially causes 
unemployment to rise and inflation to fall. In the long run, the economy reaches a new 
equilibrium in which unemployment equals the natural rate and inflation equals the new growth 
rate of nominal demand.  
The economy’s response to a technology shock is illustrated in Figure 5 for the initial 
equilibrium and for four periods following the shock. In this simulation, technology decreases by 
3% in period 1 and remains at this level indefinitely. (Nominal demand is assumed to remain 
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constant.) Unemployment and inflation both initially rise, but then decrease as the economy 
adjusts to its new equilibrium. 
 If efficiency depends on real wages, technology shocks alter the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. A technology shock changes the equilibrium real wage, and (26) shows that 
a change in the equilibrium real wage results in a different natural rate of unemployment. Thus, 
the economy is not characterized by a fixed natural rate of unemployment in response to 
technology shocks if efficiency depends on real wages. As discussed in Section V, however, it is 
much more likely that efficiency depends on relative wages in the long run. Because the 
assumption that efficiency depends on real wages probably does not describe the long run, points 
corresponding to inflation and unemployment after period 4 are not included in Figure 5.   
V. Does Workers’ Efficiency Depend on Relative or Real Wages? 
In the model in Section III, workers’ efficiency depends on their wage relative to average 
wages, while their efficiency depends on the real wage in Section IV. There is little empirical 
evidence concerning whether efficiency is a function of relative or real wages. In theory, 
workers’ efficiency is likely to depend more on relative wages than on real wages since decisions 
regarding shirking and quitting should depend on a worker’s wage relative to wages elsewhere. 
However, there are reasons why efficiency may depend on real wages in the short run. First, in 
the fair wage model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), workers may view the fair wage as a function 
of the real wage and thus feel that their employer has an obligation to compensate them for a rise 
in consumer prices. Second, even if workers are concerned about relative wages, they may use 
information about price inflation to predict how rapidly wages are rising at other firms, since 
price inflation data are more widely publicized than wage inflation data, and these series are 
highly correlated. Thus, it is possible that both real and relative wages affect efficiency in the 
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short run. In the long run, it is almost certain that efficiency depends on relative wages, since 
what ultimately matters for workers’ quit and effort decisions are their wages relative to wages 
elsewhere. For example, the dramatic rise in real wages since World War II does not appear to 
have significantly increased effort or decreased quits.   
VI. Extending the Model to Include Reference Wages  
The model can be extended to assume that workers’ efficiency depends on the ratio 
between their wage and their reference wage ( RtW ), the wage to which they compare their own 
wages in making decisions that affect their efficiency (e.g., deciding how hard to work or how 
much time to spend on job search, which affects their quit propensities). Under this assumption, 
efficiency can be expressed as 
 ],/[ t
R
tt uWWee  . 
An important determinant of the reference wage is workers’ expectations of the average 
wage, as previously assumed. However, the reference wage may also depend on workers’ 
perception of their fair wage, which may be partly determined by last period’s wage or last 
period’s wage plus norms regarding wage increases.30 Such a model can explain why firms may 
be reluctant to reduce nominal wages, even when economic conditions are very poor, and thus 
can explain how high unemployment can persist for long periods of time. In addition, if workers 
have norms about receiving annual wage increases, firms may have an incentive to raise wages 
during recessions, even though they could hire all the workers they need at last period’s wage. 
For example, wages grew 1.5% in 2009,
31
 and wage growth did not decelerate in 2010–2012 
(with rates of wage inflation of 1.6% in 2010, 1.4% in 2011, and 1.7% in 2012), in spite of 
unemployment rates of at least 7.8% in these years, well above most estimates of the natural rate. 
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A model with efficiency depending on the ratio between a worker’s wage and perceived fair 
wage can explain why wage growth did not decelerate in the presence of high unemployment.  
In the model developed in Section III, efficiency depends on workers’ wages relative to 
their expectations of average wages, and their expectations of average wages depend partly on 
lagged wages. The assumption that efficiency depends on the relationship between current wages 
and lagged wages or prices is critical to generating a downward-sloping Phillips curve. A model 
with efficiency depending on the ratio between a worker’s wage and reference wage (with the 
reference wage partly determined by past wages) provides a second avenue through which 
efficiency may depend on the relationship between current and lagged wages and thus provides 
an additional way to obtain a downward-sloping Phillips curve. 
VII. Conclusion 
While the Phillips curve has been an important part of empirical macroeconomic 
modeling, it has been a challenge for economists to provide theoretical justification for this 
relationship. This study demonstrates that a Phillips curve can be derived from a model with 
efficiency wages and imperfect information about aggregate wages or prices. The model 
incorporates both a labor market and a product market, in which firms act as wage setters and 
price setters. The model’s friction lies in the labor market, as wage or price expectations (which 
affect workers’ efficiency) depend partly on lagged values of these variables.  
The maximization problem of firms yields the dynamic labor demand curve and the 
dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition, and shifts of these curves trace out the dynamics of 
unemployment and wage or price inflation in response to shocks. If one first-order condition is 
substituted into the other, a third equation is obtained. This third relationship has the 
characteristics of a Phillips curve, as the coefficient on expected inflation equals 1 or is very 
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close to 1, inflation depends on the level of unemployment, and nominal demand is absent. Shifts 
in the DLD curve and the Phillips curve produce the same intersection points as shifts in the 
DLD curve and the DEWS condition. However, the former is a more convenient framework 
because fewer variables appear in the Phillips curve than in the DEWS condition, and the 
coefficient on expected inflation is always close to 1 in the Phillips curve, but not in the DEWS 
condition.  
If only a fraction of firms adjust wages each period, wage inflation depends on both 
lagged wage inflation and expected future wage inflation. In this case, the predicted coefficient 
on the unemployment rate in the Phillips curve approximates values that have been estimated 
with U.S. data, and the model does a very good job of predicting unemployment dynamics in 
postwar recessions. In the New Keynesian Phillips curve, lagged inflation is often included by 
making the ad hoc assumption that firms index wages or prices to past inflation if they cannot 
adjust them in the current period. In the present study, lagged inflation is an independent variable 
in the Phillips curve because expectations of aggregate wages or prices are assumed to be partly 
adaptive, in line with evidence from Levine et al. (2012). 
In conventional specifications, the Phillips curve shows the combinations of inflation and 
unemployment that are possible, but does not predict the actual values of these variables. The 
present study uses a consistent framework to derive both the Phillips curve and the dynamic 
labor demand curve. The intersections of these curves determine the values of inflation and 
unemployment that result from nominal demand shocks or technology shocks in the transition 
between the economy’s initial equilibrium and its new equilibrium. Thus, the model developed 
in this study not only shows the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, but also predicts 
the paths of these variables over time.  
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Appendix 
Derivation of (12a) and (12b) 
Let Ls  represent the steady-state value of NLt /  and  represent the short-run labor 
supply elasticity (i.e., NN / ). From (7), tdu can be approximated by 
e
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Solving the above equation for Lt yields 
e
tttLt PWdusL
ˆˆˆ 1    . (A2) 
Since Yt=Qt, totally differentiating (5) and dividing by the original equation results in the 
following expression for tYˆ : 
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eeLAY 111 ˆˆˆˆˆ    . (A3) 
Substituting (A1) and the steady-state relationships, 1/ eWW  and 11 eeW  (from 
equation (10)), into (A3) yields  
e
tLu
e
ttLutLutt PseeWWseeLseeAY
ˆˆˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆˆ 111    . (A4) 
To derive an equation for labor demand, the above steady-state conditions ( 1/ eWW  
and 11 eeW ), equation (A1), and the aggregate demand relationship, ttt YMP
ˆˆˆ  , are 
substituted into (11a). By making these substitutions, the labor demand curve can be expressed 
as 
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If (A4) is substituted into (A5), the equation for the wage simplifies to 
ttt LMW
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Substituting (A2) into (A6) yields the labor demand equation,  
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To derive the efficiency wage-setting condition, the steady-state conditions and the aggregate 
demand relationship are substituted into (11b), resulting in the expression, 
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If (A2) and (A4) are substituted into (A8), the following equation for the efficiency 
wage-setting condition is obtained: 
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Derivation of (19):
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Let x represent the wage set by firms that are able to adjust their wages. Then, 
1
ˆ)1(ˆ  ttt WxW  . 
 
Subtracting 1
ˆ
tW from both sides yields 
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where wt  is the rate of wage inflation. The optimal wage value of x is  
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where  is the discount factor and ejtW
,ˆ 
  is a firm’s expectation of its optimal wage in future 
periods. Then, 
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Simplifying the above expression yields the Phillips curve equation, 
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Derivation of (27) and (28) 
Totally differentiating (23), dividing by the original equation, and making the 
substitution,  tt QY  , yields  
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If (A2) and the equilibrium condition from (26) are substituted into (A12),  tYˆ  can be 
expressed as, 
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To obtain the labor demand curve, (25a) is totally differentiated and divided by the 
original equation, yielding 
.ˆ
)1(ˆ)1(
ˆ)1(ˆˆ)1(ˆ1ˆ
11
1
ttu
e
te
t
t
W
te
t
t
Wtttt
PdueeP
P
W
ee
W
P
W
eeLAYW
























 (A14) 
By substituting (A2) and the equilibrium condition from (26) into (A14), wages can be 
expressed as, 
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Substituting (A15) into (A13) yields, 
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If (A16) is substituted into the relationship, ttt YMP
ˆˆˆ  , the price level can be expressed 
as 
.ˆˆˆ)1(ˆ 1 tu
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   (A17)  
Equation (A17) is the labor demand curve. To obtain the efficiency wage-setting 
condition for the case in which efficiency depends on real wages, (25b) is totally differentiated 
and divided by the original equation, yielding 
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Let ePW /  (i.e., the equilibrium value of the real wage). Then substituting (26) and 
(A2) into (A18) results in the equation, 
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where 


 1)1( 

 WWW ee . 
If (A19) is substituted into (A13), output can be expressed as 
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To derive the Phillips curve, (A17) is solved for tMˆ , which yields  
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By substituting (A21) into (A20), the price level can be expressed as 
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By multiplying the numerator and denominator of the coefficient on dut by sL and e, and 
substituting the relationship,  eW PWee /
1 , the above equation can be rewritten as 
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The dynamic labor demand curve and the dynamic efficiency wage-setting condition are 
derived by, respectively, subtracting the lag of (A17) from (A17) and subtracting the lag of 
(A20) from (A20), yielding 
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The Phillips curve is derived by subtracting 1
ˆ
tP  from both sides of (A22), giving 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 Phillips (1958) finds an inverse relationship between wage inflation and unemployment with British data from 
1861-1957. Samuelson and Solow (1960) show that a similar relationship can be derived between price inflation and 
unemployment.   
2
 Studies that find econometric support for the Phillips curve include King and Watson (1994), Fuhrer (1995), 
Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997), King and Morley (2007), and Lee and Nelson (2007).  
3
 In a similar vein, Fuhrer (1995, p. 43) writes, “Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Phillips curve is its lack of 
theoretical underpinnings: No one has derived a Phillips curve from first principles, beginning with the fundamental 
concerns and constraints of consumers and firms.”    
4
 According to McCallum (1997), the Calvo-Rotemberg model of the Phillips curve has become, “the closest 
thing there is to a standard specification.”    
5
 Rudd and Whelan (2005) first regress current inflation on the discounted sum of future output gaps and find 
that the coefficient on this term has the incorrect sign. They then regress current inflation on both this discounted 
sum and lagged inflation, and they find that the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation is highly significant and 
close to 0.9. These results indicate that past inflation matters a great deal even when controlling for forward-looking 
expectations.   
6
 See Congressional Budget Office (2004) for a description of how the CBO calculates potential GDP, using 
both estimates of the natural rate and Okun’s law in its calculations.  
7
 In particular, a worker who overestimates average wages will exert less effort than is optimal, so that, on 
average, the future utility loss resulting from the increased probability of dismissal will exceed the current utility 
gain from lower effort. The opposite type of utility loss will occur if the worker underestimates average wages.    
8
 This derivation is straightforward and is available from the author upon request.   
9
 The model in Campbell (2006) differs from the model in the present study in that the previous study allows 
individuals to hold non-labor wealth, assumes that unemployed individuals receive benefits, and does not consider 
the utility from leisure. The first two differences are minor, and the third is not important if the first-order conditions 
are approximated around their steady-state values. Thus, the qualitative predictions of Campbell (2006) are valid for 
the model in the present study. In this previous study, the probability of dismissal is 2)1( emPD  , where m is 
monitoring intensity, and an individual’s probability of hire equals the number of new hires in a period divided by 
the pool of the unemployed at the beginning of the period, under the assumption that there is a constant probability 
of an exogenous separation. The fair wage in Campbell (2006) corresponds to the average wage in the present study. 
10
 In this model, efficiency depends positively on wages since higher wages raise workers’ effort by reducing 
shirking and fostering better morale. Other explanations for a positive effect of wages on efficiency include the labor 
turnover models of Stiglitz (1974), Schlicht (1978), and Salop (1979) and the adverse selection model of Weiss 
(1980).     
11
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes figures on average wages for more than 800 occupational groups, 
based on data from the May CPS, but these figures are not published until the following March, a lag of ten months.  
12
 Assuming a positive relationship between wages and efficiency does not guarantee that there will be excess 
supply of labor. Whether a firm operates on its labor supply curve or to the left of its labor supply curve (i.e., pays 
an efficiency wage) depends on the elasticity of output with respect to the wage, calculated at the market-clearing 
wage. Parameters are chosen so that firms maximize profits by operating to the left of their labor supply curves. 
13
 This elasticity is based on Weisskopf’s (1987) and Wadhwani and Wall’s (1991) estimates of the effect of 
unemployment on productivity. See Campbell (2008), which also uses the same conditions to derive ue  and Wue  
(except that equilibrium unemployment is set at 6% in this earlier study), for a discussion of Weisskopf’s and 
Wadhwani and Wall’s findings. Campbell (2008) also discusses the assumptions about the interest rate, the 
proportion of workers who are dismissed, the probability of an exogenous separation, and the ratio between 
unemployment benefits and average wages. Similar results are obtained when the model is calibrated with quarterly 
data and with annual data. In the present study, 8.0ue , 609.4Wue , and 981.3WWe . 
14
 See, for example, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Card (1991). Assuming that =0 means that it is not 
necessary to model the formation of price expectations.  
15
 Reis (2006) develops microfoundations for a model in which optimizing producers sporadically update their 
information in setting plans for the prices they charge. A similar framework could be used to model the way that 
workers update their information about average wages.  
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16
 The adaptive component equals last period’s wage plus a weighted average of past wage inflation. Campbell 
(2008) also assumes that expectations are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations, but uses a simpler 
specification for the adaptive component. 
17
 In Campbell (2013), workers can estimate the average wage by observing lagged average wages at a low 
fixed cost and by incurring an added variable cost to acquire additional information about the mean of the current 
wage distribution through sampling wages at other firms and through obtaining and processing macroeconomic data. 
Individuals acquire the amount of information that minimizes the sum of information acquisition costs and the 
expected utility loss resulting from imperfect information (since the effort of workers who form incorrect 
expectations is non-optimal). Workers use a Kalman filtering process to predict the current average wage, and it is 
demonstrated that expectations are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations if workers sample wages at other 
firms or if they acquire macroeconomic information and orthogonally update previous information. In the adaptive 
component, workers look at an infinite number of lags (i.e., T=∞), with exponentially declining values of .   
18
 Using annual Employment Cost Index data, current wage inflation was regressed on five values of lagged 
wage inflation. The coefficient on the first lag was close to 1, and the coefficients on further lags were close to 0.  
19
 An arrow is not used to show the rightward shift of the DLD curve between periods 2 and 3 in Figure 1a since 
the distance between the lines is too small. 
20
 This derivation makes use of the fact that 11 eeW  in equilibrium, from (10). 
21
 See equation 25 on p. 698 of Phelps (1968).    
22
 While the value of WWe  predicted by the model of Campbell (2006) results in a Phillips curve slope that is 
much higher than empirically estimated slopes when wages can be adjusted each period, this value of WWe  predicts 
the Phillips curve slope reasonably accurately when only a fraction of firms adjust wages in each period.    
23
 This could occur if firms set wages simultaneously and if wages vary across firms (as previously assumed), 
so that firms cannot infer the average wage from the wage they set.   
24
 Galí’s (2011) estimate of the Phillip curve slope is lower when more recent data are included because of the 
unusual behavior of wages in the most recent recession.  
25
 Varying  does not have a large effect on the Phillips curve slope. In the range 0≤≤keeping the other 
parameters constant)the Phillips curve slope lies between -0.117 and -0.152 (although if =1, the Phillip curve 
shifts immediately to keep the economy at its natural rate). In addition, if * is varied within reasonable values (0.2 
to 0.5), the slope lies between -0.127 and -0.168.   
26
 If the unemployment rate in the first quarter of a recession (based on NBER dating) is higher than in the 
previous quarter, the first quarter is treated as period 1. Otherwise, the subsequent quarter is treated as period 1. The 
calculations for the median time for ut to fall to within 0.2% of u* do not include the 1969-70 recession, since 
unemployment was below the natural rate for almost the entire recession, and do not include the 1980 recession, 
since unemployment was not close to the natural rate until after the subsequent recession. The reasons for using the 
criteria that unemployment falls to within 0.2% of the CBO’s natural rate estimate are that the CBO’s estimate may 
be imprecise and that, following two recessions (the ones beginning in 1960:II and 1990:III), the unemployment rate 
fell to within 0.2% of the CBO’s estimate of u*, subsequently rose, and did not reach u* for more than a year. 
27
 It is possible to allow  to be different for firms (f) and workers (w). With the specification used in Figure 
3 that f=w=0.25, the maximum unemployment rate is 7.4%. The maximum unemployment rate is 7.2% if f =0.25 
and w=1 and is 5.1% if f=1 and w=0.25. Thus, while workers’ imperfect information is critical and firms’ 
imperfect information is irrelevant if wages are adjusted each period, firms’ imperfect information is much more 
important than workers’ imperfect information if wages are adjusted less frequently.  
28
 This is the same equation for the price-price Phillips curve that is derived in Campbell (2010), except it was 
implicitly assumed that  was normalized to 1 in Campbell (2010).   
29
 In this simulation, the parameters are the same as those in Figures 1a and 2. In addition,  (the elasticity of 
output with respect to labor) is set equal to 0.7, and  (the equilibrium ratio between wages and prices) is assumed to 
equal 1.  
30
 The fair wage-effort hypothesis is developed in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), and the concept of norms is 
discussed in Akerlof (2007). 
31
 Wage inflation figures are based on fourth quarter to fourth quarter changes in the Employment Cost Index 
for the wages and salaries of all civilian workers.  
32
 This derivation follows Romer (2012, pp. 329-331).  
